The following is another entry in Michael Gladius‘s ongoing series on Counter-Revolutionary Case Studies. It is very interesting and I highly recommend you check it out!
The Siege of Jadotville (Ireland’s Alamo)
In 2016, an excellent movie came out on Netflix depicting this battle.
Here is the trailer for it (although I highly recommend watching the whole thing):
In 1960, the Congo became independent from Belgium. The process was anything but smooth, and internal strife began even before the declaration.
The Congo was of great interest to the UN, NATO, and the Warsaw Pact nations due to its vast mineral wealth and uranium deposits.
A mutiny broke out among the army in July of 1961, when African troops were told that the army would remain the same, and that their expected promotions and pay raises would not be forthcoming. Ethnic violence followed, Belgium sent in paratroopers to rescue whites, and Prime Minister Lumumba asked for assistance from the UN to suppress the revolt. The UN refused, stating that to do so would violate their impartiality and Congo sovereignty.
In response, Lumumba turned to the USSR, who was only too happy to assist with weapons and advisors. This shift towards the Soviet sphere of influence alarmed many, Katanga province in particular.
Katanga, located in the south of the country, was home to many Belgians and mining companies. Fearing that Lumumba would nationalize their mines and become a radical socialist, Katanga rallied behind General Tshombe, who seceded from the Congo, although nobody formally recognized the new nation.
Tshombe declared that the secession was necessary for several reasons: Katanga was ethnically different from the northern provinces, and more closely aligned to neighboring Rhodesia, the move would prevent chaos from spreading, secession would allow the Katangese to keep their wealth, and check Soviet influence. However, the UN insisted that the Congo not be split.
Things escalated further when Lumumba was captured and handed over to Tshombe’s men, who summarily executed him. NATO and the Warsaw Pact came dangerously close to war, and the UN desperately needed to bolster its presence in order to prove its relevance as a neutral third party.
The UN increased its peacekeeping forces, and encouraged the Belgians to reduce their own troop presence, while attempting to broker a ceasefire and arrest foreign mercenaries.
These foreign mercenaries were in high demand by all sides of the war, and the UN considered their presence to be destabilizing. Going after them would also enable the UN to demilitarize the region without singling out any countries in particular, but rather focusing on eliminating illegal, non-government, private armies.
UN peacekeeping forces went on the offensive against the mercenaries on September 13th, 1961, after deploying troops to protect civilians.
One such unit was A Company, 35th Battalion, an Irish unit comprised of 155 men under Commander Pat Quinlan. Being untested in battle, they were assigned garrison duty in Jadotville (today called Likasi), a small mining town on the sidelines, away from the action.
Upon arrival, they found the local Belgians hostile, and strongly pro-Katangese. Commander Quinlan ordered trenches to be dug, despite not expecting any attacks (the following illustrations show modern designs, rather than the primitive trenches actually used in the battle).
As the UN advanced against the mercenaries and took control over Elizabethville, Katanga’s capital city, the local mercenaries and mining companies decided to attack Jadotville that same day. Hoping to catch the Irish by surprise, they began forming up for their attack while the Irish were attending Mass. An alert sentry spotted them, however, sounded the alarm, and the Irish repelled the attack from their trenches.
For the next six days, the Irish were cut off from their supply lines. Several attempts by UN forces to break the siege and evacuate the company ended in failure, as well as an attempt to resupply the garrison with water, which saw a helicopter shot down.
The attackers were a mix of Belgian locals, mercenaries hired by mining companies, and African tribesmen. They were well-armed with modern weaponry, including 81mm mortars, a 75 mm French field gun, and a training jet armed with bombs and machine guns. In total, they outnumbered the Irish garrison 20-to-1.
The outnumbered Irish only had small arms, light machine guns, and 60mm mortars, but benefitted from being entrenched, and surrounded by flat, open terrain which offered no cover to their attackers. Furthermore, the Irish marksmanship proved to be vastly superior (see clip from film below).
Accurate rifle fire tore apart the assault waves, and Irish counterbattery fire from their mortars knocked out multiple enemy heavy guns. It became so bad for the attackers that the mercenaries were seen shooting tribesmen who ran away, in an attempt to prevent a total collapse of their forces.
After 6 days of fighting, however, the Irish ran out of food, water, and ammunition and were forced to surrender. No Irish soldiers died in the fighting, although 5 were severely wounded. The Irish were taken prisoner, and exchanged for Katangese prisoners a month later.
How it’s relevant for us
Jadotville is an excellent template for defending small, rural towns across the Occident in the event of future/potential 4th Generation Warfare/destabilization.
The Islamist-Communist coalitions will increasingly dominate the cities across Western Europe, but native Occidentals still dominate the countryside, and they tend to be more moderate-right. When countries like Sweden eventually collapse at some point in the future, the cities will be unable to survive without controlling the rural areas.
The globalists realize this, and are trying to preempt this by forcing small towns of 200 inhabitants to provide homes for 500+ migrants. Testifying to the gravity of the situation and the potential for eventual violence, we already see examples of native Europeans burning down such migrant centers:
In Balkanized areas, those towns that can stay homogeneous- or quickly become so when anarchy breaks out- form the skeletal structure of any ‘safe zones’ for friendly forces, and provide launchpads for counter-revolutionary efforts.
For a force attempting to defend such rural areas, an optimal solution would be to fortify a network of small towns within each friendly county/province, as well as any key ground (commanding heights, bridges, fords, mountain passes, etc.), with patrols and lookouts monitoring, interdicting, and projecting force over the area as a whole.
Ideally, these defenses should be able to support one another, keep open resupply/evacuation routes, and offer multiple redundant/backup layers of defense. Establishing landlines between these strongholds is also recommended, as radio jamming and interference are significant threats on the battlefield today. Mobile forces patrolling the gaps need radios/walkie-talkies, static forces do not.
A network of small towns is beneficial for both military and logistical reasons. Militarily, fortifications enable a town or valuable piece of ground to be defended with fewer men, freeing up more forces for offensive operations (reconnaissance, interdiction, ambushes, search-and-destroy, raids, counterblows, Quick-Reaction Forces, etc.).
Having control of multiple buildings within a town, and multiple towns within a region, will greatly assist tactical and operational maneuvers, respectively. In both instances, they provide covered positions from which forces can attack the enemy, and to which those forces can retreat and defend if they are defeated.
However, any buildings a group plans to defend must be bulletproof, offer protections against heavy weapons (i.e., incendiary and explosives), and have several ways to escape (no isolated buildings). Any new additions to such defenses should be concealed.
In defense of a town itself, men who have limited mobility can contribute to the fight in ways that they cannot in open warfare (see clip from Zulu below):
Even women and children can help defend a town in a desperate fight, both as fighters and as auxiliaries: reloading rifles for shooters, tending to the wounded, carrying water and supplies, etc. Marksmanship, fieldcraft, and all other fundamentals will come into play, although any fighting within the town itself will resemble trench warfare (such as in Fallujah), rather than maneuver warfare.
For a good illustration of a platoon-sized element performing such a task, read ‘The Defence of Bowler Bridge,’ available for free here: http://regimentalrogue.com/bowler/bowler_bridge.htm
Logistically, towns can function as stockpiles for supplies, in order to reduce the logistical burden carried by mobile formations (unless there is a need for secrecy, in which case buried caches are better). They will also protect any cottage industries that may appear within.
Another consideration is an influx of refugees fleeing violence. In the modern West, should nations such as Sweden eventually destabilize completely (say when they have become 60% Islamic perhaps and that 60% is even battling within itself over Shia-Sunni divisions) then an exodus of native Europeans from the cities would be expected (indeed, we are already seeing many Europeans flee to Hungary/Poland/etc from Western Europe on a more macro level as well).
In that event, such tactical considerations as described above would be critical in ensuring proper defense and consolidation of said areas.
The prosperity and peace seen within the modern West for the last 60 years has been a fluke of history totally at odds with all that came before it. The fact that Europe is importing tens of millions of immigrants from societies that have been racked by civil violence and conflict all through those 60 years suggests strongly that the period of peace in the West is ending.
Tragically, this will turn the tactics and considerations like those in Jadotville into real life concerns, rather than just content for entertainment.
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