Below is another article by Michael Gladius analyzing a historical conflict (in this case the conflicts in Finland from the first half of the twentieth century).
I think its implicit, but the series of articles in question isn’t supposed to suggest that real actual 1900’s-style civil war is imminent in Europe. Obviously I do think Europe is going to destabilize and become more and more anarchic and Balkanized and that great violence is going to occur, but the point of articles like this is primarily self-education.
Even if Europe follows a Houellebecquian-path, and Sweden and France the UK all fall into submission and Islamization, a thorough knowledge of military history and application is invaluable for the goal of trying to preserve whatever remnants can be saved.
(Note: The above reference is to this book: Submission: A Novel)
All the great men of history whose deeds allowed us to be here today were experts on those subjects, and an understanding of them is something that should be sought for numerous reasons.
In that vein, here is Mr. Gladius’ article…
Introduction: Counter-revolutionary Case Studies
By Michael Gladius
I will be writing a series of essays on various conflicts that I think will be appropriate for the counter-revolution. History offers us many lessons, and I hope to make them known to you, gentle reader. Most of these conflicts are lesser-known, obscure events, which I feel is easier to study objectively. I encourage you to read up on these events more, as my essays are merely a summary of what happened, condensing the lessons useful to our cause. All of them take place in the 20th century, and I will proceed in chronological order.
The Winter War (Fire and Ice)
How The Finns fought
During the Finnish Civil War, the Whites chose as their leader Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim (a member of the Finnish Aristocracy who had served as a cavalry officer under the Russian Czar, and an amazing guy in his own right), and armed themselves by confiscating weapons from Russian garrisons before escorting them to the border.
The whites also recalled 1900 Finnish volunteers training as Jaeger light infantry in Germany, giving them a significant advantage over the Reds. Apart from these, both sides in the civil war were untrained and poorly disciplined. The war became known as the war of the amateurs.
Victory was achieved through reducing Red strongholds and capturing the major industrial areas. Towards the end of the war, German and Swedish forces intervened on behalf of the whites, and completed the victory.
In the winter war, much was different. The Soviet army had recovered from the civil war, and was now much larger and better-equipped. The Soviets now had an abundance of modern tanks and aircraft, while Finland’s small industrial base meant that most of their equipment was scarce and out-of-date. Nonetheless, Mannerheim insisted upon mobilization for war, and the construction of fortifications along Finland’s southern border.
In the south, the land was flat and passable for motor vehicles on the way to Finland’s major cities along the coast. The fortifications in the south became known as the Mannerheim Line, and the war in the south resembled the First World War.
The Soviets did manage to break through several times, but Finnish counterattacks plugged the gaps in time. Like the Boers, the Finns needed to be stingy with their ammunition, particularly for heavy guns and artillery pieces. These they supplemented with an array of improvised weapons, most notably Molotov cocktails and satchel charges to defeat Soviet tanks.
Finland did not fortify its eastern border, which was heavily wooded and trackless, and would thus negate much of the Soviets’ advantages in armor. Here, the Finns did not expect the Soviets to attack in force, as the territory held little strategic value. The Soviets, however, sent in numerous divisions, which faced Finnish units one-third to one-fifth their size.
Using the heavy forests for cover, and using ski troopers, the Finns used snipers and hit-and-run tactics (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yHrndb0oZEc) to immobilize Soviet columns, which were restricted to the narrow logging paths.
The Finns would hit the front and back of each column first so that it could not advance or retreat, then slowly begin to cut it into smaller and smaller pieces until it surrendered or was annihilated. These tactics, called ‘mottis’ (after a bundle of cut wood), allowed the Finns to conserve their forces and capture large quantities of Soviet equipment.
Aiding this mottis tactic were the Finns’ extensive use of lightweight automatic weapons. Both sides used light machine guns (LMG) during the war, but the Soviets did not carry submachine guns (SMG) at this time. The Finns used both SMGs and LMGs to great effect, both in the trenches and in the heavy forests.
Finnish raiders would stealthily creep up to Soviet forces under cover of darkness, silently kill the sentries, and then ski through the camps, gunning down Soviet troops. In the Mannerheim line, SMGs were integral to trench warfare, especially if a trench was overrun and needed to be retaken. SMGs also gave the added benefit of being cheap to mass produce, allowing Finnish troops to be well armed without straining their manufacturing/logistics chain.
How The Communists Fought
The Soviet Union had far greater material superiority over the Finns when the winter war began. The Soviets had expanded their industrial base (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PaFklTLNy8c&t=187s) through cooperation with western corporations, and had access to modern equipment. Yet this technological advantage was much less useful in the northern and eastern fronts of the war than in the south. On the Karelian Isthmus, the land was flat, and conducive to mechanized warfare. Had the Finns not fortified this region, the Soviets would have easily overrun the outnumbered and outgunned Finns, and been within striking distance of Finland’s industrial cities.
A significant part of the reason for the Soviet Union’s failures during the war was due to the Purge. The Purge did not remove all the experienced officers from the red army, but did increase the power of commissars (political party officers). The newfound power of the commissars meant that these men interfered with the competent Soviet officers’ decision-making at every turn.
The human wave attacks that characterized the start of both the Winter War and WWII were the work of the commissars, not the professional army. In both wars, these led to disaster. Once the commissars were weakened, however, the professional soldiers were permitted to make good decisions, and each war turned around.
In the Winter War, the Soviets changed their strategy once the commissars’ power was reduced. The new commanders, Semyon Timoshenko and Andrei Zhdanov, chose to focus their attacks against the Karelian Isthmus alone, and to ignore the north/east fronts.
Even with the Mannerheim line, the Finns could not stop the Soviet attacks, and began to run out of men and equipment, while the Soviets’ strength only grew. The Finns could not hold back the Soviets conventionally, and their last hope for survival was the arrival of British and French troops. These, however, were unable to reach Finland in time, and the Finnish government sued for peace.
The Soviets were equally eager to end the war, for both political and military reasons, but their position of strength enabled them to demand even more territory than before the war. Finland had no choice but to accept.
How It’s Relevant
The first lesson of this war is the need for professional soldiers in an army. The Jaeger battalions enabled the white Finns to defeat the reds during the Civil War, and the Finns needed to use conventional tactics to win both wars.
It should also serve as a cautionary tale against having political officers in an army. Among the right, there are many who have no military background, training, or experience, yet believe themselves to be inherently smarter than actual soldiers. It is unlikely that our Islamic enemies will have political officers, so we ourselves must avoid this temptation.
The lessons in fieldcraft, fortifications, and logistics are also helpful here. The Finns, like the Boers, came from a more rural, primitive background, but had a sizable percentage of city-dwellers in their ranks. Like the Boers, the Finns were naturally more comfortable in the field, and relied on fieldcraft, stealth, and off-road mobility in order to compensate for their material inferiority. For city boys, this was (and still can be) taught by the Army, and their stipends can enable them to take lessons from private organizations, which are usually ahead of the curve.
As for fortifications, the Mannerheim Line was not particularly strong, but it was still better than nothing. I can easily foresee smaller towns and rural villages being fortified in order to protect noncombatants, and enabling them to be defended by militia, thus freeing up professional soldiers for offensive operations.
Logistics are also important to the fight. The Finns’ reliance on LMGs and SMGs to offset their numeric inferiority is worth consideration, particularly after 2020, when the majority of the fighting-age population will be non-European.
When the fight begins, it will likely be in larger cities, and involve large mobs and street battles. Trench warfare and urban warfare tactics will be the norm until the fighting spills out of the cities.
Slow-firing, long-range weapons will have limited use in these conditions, but lightweight weapons with a high rate of fire will dominate. SMGs are much cheaper to make and produce than assault rifles, and easier to handle for beginners. Pistol ammunition is cheap and easy to mass-produce, and as the war goes on, SMGs can be eventually replaced with proper assault rifles. Even after they’re replaced, however, they can still be useful for teaching marksmanship to the masses, and be an effective police weapon.
Equally relevant is the need for improvising (http://www.nakka-rocketry.net/). The Finns lacked heavy weaponry in large numbers, and needed their rifle platoons to be able to fight with minimal support. The right must not train to rely on tanks, artillery fire, or air support in order to win.
Squads, platoons, and even fire teams must learn to be more self-reliant and adaptable than our foes, who will likely have greater resources than us, and will likely operate in platoon- to company-sized forces.
Editor’s Note: Big thanks to Michael for another excellent article.
To learn more about the Winter War in Finland and other topics mentioned, check out any of the following books:
Also, while we’re on the subject of WWII, if you’ve never seen the film Downfall (Der Untergang), about the last days of the Third Reich in the bunker in Berlin, its absolutely incredible. Must see film.